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Executive Summary
The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office was created in 2005 with the purpose of
increasing the United States’ detection efforts for radiological and nuclear (RN) threats by
terrorists. The office was given the responsibility of developing the overseeing the Global
Nuclear Detection Architecture, a cross-agency strategy for detecting, analyzing, and reporting
of RN materials outside of regulatory control. In 2012 the Government Accountability Office
expressed concern over the prioritization of GNDA resources as well as the documentation of
GNDA progress over time, so the DNDO asked the National Research Council (NRC) for advice
on how to develop performance measures and metrics to quantifiably assess the GNDA’s
effectiveness. The result of an extensive NRC study was a report titled “Performance Metrics for
the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture.” In the report the appointed committee created a
notional strategic planning example for evaluating the performance of the GNDA.
The subject of the following report is the creation of a value model that was based off of
the NRC’s strategic example and that can be used as an example for evaluating the GNDA’s
performance. The report demonstrates that it is feasible to create an adequate performance rating
for the GNDA using the techniques of multiple-objective decision analysis.
There were several important tasks associated with the model development as well as
model use and analysis. The steps in model development included establishing the goals,
objectives, and sub-objectives of the model; developing the metrics used to evaluate the
objectives; and creating the value functions necessary to convert the metrics to a common scale.
The resulting model had four main goals that were divided into ten objectives and nine subobjectives. These objectives were measured by twenty-five distinct metrics.
In terms of model use and evaluation, the activities included scoring the metrics,
establishing weights, and performing both sensitivity and cost-benefit analysis. The metrics were
given notional scores unless publicly accessible data was available. For establishing weights,
three different sets of weights were created: (1) equal weights for all measures, (2) weights to
based on government spending, and (3) weights based on the adversary’s viewpoint.
Based on these three weight sets and the notional values used, the weight set based on
government spending had a higher mean score than the set of equal weights. This shows that,
assuming the notional data is reasonable, aspects of nuclear counterterrorism that the government
considers to be more important correlate with the aspects that are performing better. However,
the score based on the adversary’s stance had the lowest score indicating room for improvement.
Analysis techniques were performed for the set of weights based on government spending. A
sensitivity analysis example was used to highlight how changing the percent of total weight of a
metric has an effect on the overall model value. An example of cost-benefit analysis
demonstrated how a proposed increase or decrease in GNDA government spending could be
modeled to calculate the change in the model’s overall performance rating.
This report demonstrates that it is possible to evaluate the performance of the Global
Nuclear Detection Architecture using multiple-objective decision analysis techniques. The
DNDO can adjust the model as necessary, create a standard set of weights, and input the
classified data in order to come up with an adequate performance rating of the GNDA.
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1

Introduction
Protecting the nation against radiological and nuclear terrorism is one of the United

States Government’s top priorities. Efforts to detect radiological and nuclear (RN) materials have
existed for many years. However, in 2005 the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) was
established within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) with the responsibility of
improving the nation’s nuclear detection efforts for radiological and nuclear threats. The DNDO
was given the responsibility of developing the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture (GNDA), a
cross-agency strategy for detecting, analyzing, and reporting of nuclear and radiological
materials outside of regulatory control.
Evaluating the effectiveness of the GNDA has proven to be a difficult task. In 2011 the
DNDO asked National Research Council (NRC) for advice on how to develop performance
measures and metrics to quantifiably assess the GNDA’s effectiveness. The culmination of their
findings and recommendations were published in a document titled “Performance Metrics for the
Global Nuclear Detection Architecture,” and the abbreviated version was released to the public.
This report details the creation of a value model that is based off the NRC committee’s
findings and is used to evaluate the overall effectiveness of the GNDA. The report is broken into
five sections, including the introduction. The remaining sections are detailed below:
Section 2: Background information on the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture and the
study conducted by the National Research Council
Section 3: Model development and the associated tasks
Section 4: Model use and analysis techniques used to evaluate the model
Section 5: Conclusion and significance of study
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2

Background

2. 1 The Global Nuclear Detection Architecture
The GNDA is comprised of a “worldwide network of sensors, telecommunications, and
personnel, with the supporting information exchanges, programs, and protocols” that contribute
to its overall goal of using detection and interdiction capabilities to combat smuggling outside
the United States, at the U.S. Border, and inside the border (National Research Council, 2013).
The GNDA specifically deals with RN materials out of regulatory control, referring to “materials
that are being imported, possessed, stored, transported, developed, or used without authorization
by the appropriate regulatory authority, either inadvertently or deliberately” (Hart, 2012).
Because protecting the nation against nuclear terrorism involves a great number of facets, the
DNDO has to work closely with Federal, State, local, tribal, international, and private sector
partners in order to implement and oversee the GNDA. Beyond just developing the GNDA, the
DNDO is charged specifically with the implementation of the domestic portion of the
architecture.
In the implementation of the GNDA, the DNDO works closely with several other federal
agencies, including
•

Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

•

Director of National Intelligence (DNI)

•

Department of Defense (DOD)

•

Department of State (DOS)

•

Department of Justice, primarily the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

•

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC)
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The DNDO also works with several other agencies within the DHS such as Customs Border
Protection (CBP) and the U.S. Coast Guard.
The Global Nuclear Detection Architecture is one part of the larger nuclear
counterterrorism (NCT) effort to reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism. The NCT efforts are often
described as a spectrum that range from material security all the way to forensics and attribution
after an event. This spectrum, as well as where the GNDA’s role fits in, is shown below in
Figure 1.
Figure 1. Nuclear Counterterrorism Spectrum

SOURCE: National Research Council, 2013

As shown in Figure 1, the scope of the GNDA lies directly between material security (RN
materials under regulatory control) and interdiction (the recovery of RN materials to regulatory
control). Therefore, the activities of the GNDA do not aim to secure regulated RN materials or
return RN materials to regulatory control; they are only concerned with the detection portion of
the NCT spectrum.
The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office defines detection as the use of both active and
passive technical equipment as well as nontechnical means such as intelligence information to
identify RN materials out of regulatory control. The GNDA is preventive in the mission of
nuclear counterterrorism because it includes both detecting RN materials before an event occurs
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and also deterring adversaries as a result of the increased possibility of an adversary’s attempt
being detected.

2. 2

GNDA Structure
In order to increase the probability of detecting an adversary’s attempt to commit an act of

radiological or nuclear terrorism on the United States, the GNDA is structured as a multi-layer
defense system. One way to view the GNDA components is through its “geographical view”
which consists of three main geographical layers: exterior to the U.S., the U.S. border, and inside
the U.S. Cross-cutting efforts that span multiple layers and pathways also exist. The definitions
of each layer are given from the DHS website:
• “The exterior layer comprises the foreign origin, foreign transit and foreign departure sublayers. We improve radiological and nuclear material detection abroad through efforts
that encourage foreign nations or regions to develop and enhance their nuclear detection
architectures.”
• “The transit and border layer (trans-border) is composed of transit to the U.S. from a
foreign port of departure or non-port of departure, as well as passing through the U.S.
border prior to entering the U.S. interior. This represents the last opportunity to detect
radiological or nuclear materials prior to their arrival onto U.S. territory, and initiatives in
this layer emphasize maritime domain awareness related to preventive
radiological/nuclear detection.”
• “The interior layer of the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture (GNDA) includes all areas
within and up to, but not including, the U.S. border. The interior layer focuses on
increasing nuclear detection capabilities across the maritime, air, and land pathways and
addressing a wide array of potential threats.”
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• “Cross-cutting efforts focus on programs and capabilities spanning multiple layers and
pathways of the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture (GNDA). Efforts undertaken in
this layer provide the basis for time-phased deterrence and detection strategies. These
elements streamline existing capabilities, improve overall coordination and ultimately
seek to enhance radiological and nuclear detection at the federal, state, territorial, tribal
and local levels.” Efforts in this area include developing a risk and cost benefit
assessment for the architecture as well as performing studies to benefit the overall
strategic plan of the GNDA
A diagram of the three main geographical layers is shown below in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Geographical view of GNDA

SOURCE: National Research Council, 2013
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2. 3

Performance Metrics for the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture

2. 3. 1 Background and Tasks
Evaluating the performance and improvements of the GNDA’s overall effectiveness has
proven to be a challenging task. Currently, the DNDO collects annual self-assessments from
each of the GNDA’s partner agencies, and the office is able to come up with a listing of progress
from individual programs. However, combining this data in order to measure to measure the
overall performance of the GNDA is where the difficulties arise.
In 2011 the DNDO asked National Research Council (NRC) of the National Academy of
Sciences for advice on how to develop performance measures and metrics to quantifiably assess
the GNDA’s effectiveness. This development would be of great value because it would allow for
the GNDA’s progress and improvements to be quantifiably be tracked over time, and, by doing
so, it can be “used to improve the GNDA strategic plan during future annual review cycles”
(National Research Council, 2013). Specifically, the DNDO asked the council to perform two
tasks: (1) to assess the feasibility of using performance measures and quantitative metrics for
evaluation progress towards meeting the performance goals in the GNDA Strategic Plan, and (2)
recommend approaches for evaluating the overall effectiveness of the GNDA. A full statement of
these tasks can be found in Appendix II.
The NRC appointed a committee of twelve experts from a variety of related fields to
carry out the study. The committee met beginning in May 2012 and several times throughout the
next year to review the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture and develop their
recommendations. The culmination of their findings and recommendations was a report titled
“Performance Metrics for the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture.” While the official report
is classified, the abbreviated version was released to the public in December 2013.
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2. 3. 2 Observations, Findings, and Recommendations
The committee discovered significant challenges when addressing the feasibility of
developing measures and metrics against the performance goals of the existing strategic plan.
The committee found that while it is essentially feasible to create measures to evaluate
performance of the GNDA, it was not feasible to create appropriate outcome-based metrics with
the current strategic plan. The current goals, objectives, and performance goals of the GNDA
Strategic Plan did not directly link to the architecture’s overall mission. Also, these components
are primarily output- and process-based.
The committee stated two conditions that had to be met in order to appropriately evaluate
the effectiveness of the GNDA. First, a new strategic plan with outcome-based metrics would
have to be created, and, secondly, an analysis framework had to be developed to allow of the
assessment of outcome-based metrics.

2. 3. 3 Notional Strategic Planning Example with Metrics
In response to the committee’s findings presented in the previous section, the committee
gave a notional strategic planning example with outcome-based metrics in the fourth chapter of
the report. In this chapter the committee also gave recommendations for strategic planning on the
development of performance metrics. While the committee only gave a couple examples of
possible performance measures, the strategic plan that the committee created was structured in a
way that allows for the development of appropriate outcome-based metrics.
As noted in the report, a strategic plan must encompass the “vision, mission, and highlevel goals and objectives of an organization or program.” The vision statement of an
organization lays out the overarching goal and purpose of the organization, while the mission
statement describes how the vision statement can be achieved. The goals and their corresponding
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objectives must contribute to the mission, and must span the scope of the mission so that every
aspect is considered. It is important to not overlook objectives that are difficult to measure. The
report states that, “often strategic planning is guided by available data rather than by a logical set
of goals and objectives that address the mission.”
For the notional example, the committee considered the broad range of radiological and
nuclear terrorism, and then they narrowed the strategic plan to the aspects that were in the scope
of the GNDA. The vision and mission statements they created are as follow:
•

Vision: “For U.S. citizens to live free from the fear of nuclear or radiological terrorism.”

•

Mission: “Protect the nation from terrorist attacks that use radiological or nuclear (RN)
materials.”

From these two statements, they created a series of five goals that supported the mission along
with a several objectives for each of these goals. The goals in their strategic plan example were:
Goal 1: Reduce the threat to the nation of radiological or nuclear (RN) attacks by
terrorists
Goal 2: Reduce the vulnerability of the nation to RN attacks by terrorists
Goal 3: Reduce the consequences of a successful radiological or nuclear attack on the
nation
Goal 4: Reduce the unintended side effects of RN countermeasures
Goal 5: Reduce costs of RN countermeasures
As mentioned, each of these goals had multiple underlying objectives. For example, a couple of
the objectives related to Goal 2—Reducing the vulnerability of the nation to RN attacks by
terrorists—are to detect RN materials out of regulator control by layers of detection (outside the
U.S., at the border of the U.S., and inside the U.S.). A complete list of the goals, their objectives,

14

and the few metrics that were given in the report is shown in Appendix III. As noted earlier, the
only objectives that are within the GNDA scope are those that relate to detection and deterrence.
These objectives are highlighted with stars in the appendix.
The notional example that the committee created is not intended to be complete. While
the example gives goals and objectives that span the spectrum of protecting the national against
nuclear and radiological terrorism, the committee intentionally did not include metrics for every
objective. Instead they wanted the DNDO to use the example as a good starting point from which
to refine the mission and goals and then come up with a complete set of objectives for each goal.

3

Model Development
Performance measurement and value modeling (a technique of multiple-objective

decision analysis), when applied correctly, are useful applications for evaluating the
effectiveness and progress for programs or businesses (Parnell, Driscoll, and Henderson, 2011).
This section of the report describes the tasks and activities performed to develop a performancerating model. The model to evaluate the effectiveness of the Global Nuclear Detection
Architecture was created using the software Logical Decisions. Logical Decisions is decisionmaking software that uses multiple-objective decision analysis to evaluate alternatives. The
activities and steps required to complete the model were (1) refining the goals, objectives, and
sub-objectives; (2) developing the metrics; and (3) assigning value functions for each measure.
The first two activities are combined together in the following section.

3.1

Establishing Goals and Objectives and Developing Metrics
In creating the performance model for the GNDA, the first step was to create the overall

hierarchical structure. Because the committee came up with a very sensible vision and mission
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statement, these were unchanged in the model. The main goals that support the mission were also
kept the same, bar one exception: Goal 5—Reduce the cost of RN countermeasures—was
removed. The reason this goal was removed is because cost is typically not included in value
models. Instead, cost is introduced to compare alternatives using a cost vs. value analysis. This
topic is touched on briefly later in the “Cost Analysis” section. The complete overarching
structure, composed of the vision, mission, and main goals, is shown below in Figure 3.
Figure 3. Model Overarching Structure

Now that the four main goals were established, the objectives were adapted from the list
the committee came up with and sub-objectives were created when deemed sensible. For each
objective or sub-objective, one or more metrics were developed to measure the GNDA
performance.

3. 1. 1 Goal 1: Reduce the Threat
For Goal 1—Reduce the threat to the nation of RN attacks on the nation—the two
objectives presented by the committee were maintained and no sub-objectives were added. The
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objectives and metrics for Goal 1 are shown below in Figure 4. For Figure 4 and the following
figures used in this section, the main goals are shown in light green while objectives and subobjectives are in the light blue and orange boxes, respectfully, and the metrics are shown in the
darker blue.
Figure 4. Goal 1 Objectives and Metrics

The metrics associated with Goal 1 are (1) the probability of deterrence by denial, and (2)
the probability of identifying terrorist plans via intelligence efforts. While these metrics are
outcome-based, they will not be easy to measure. An entire sub-section of the report is based on
the quantification and measurement of deterrence. Because of the complexity, the deterrence by
denial for this model would be the calculated using the Probabilistic Effectiveness Methodology
(PEM). PEM is a “simulation tool with a holistic approach for nuclear smuggling” (Cuéllar et al.,
2011). Similarly, the second metric, the probability of identifying terrorist plans via intelligence
efforts would be assessed by the Intelligence Community.
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3. 1. 2 Goal 2: Reduce the Vulnerability
While the structure for Goal 1 is pretty straightforward, Goal 2—Reduce the vulnerability
of the nation to RN attacks by terrorists—is more complex and involves more components. The
main objectives of Goal 2 that were outlined in the report were broken down into detection
efforts by geographical layers, and they remained unchanged for this model. These objectives are
shown below in Figure 5.
Figure 5. Goal 2 Objectives

Each of these objectives has several sub-objectives that were created. First Objective 2.1
and the detection of RN materials outside of the United Sates will be addresses.
As described earlier in section 2.2, sub-layers of the exterior layer of the architecture
include foreign origin, foreign transit, and foreign departure. For the purpose of this model,
foreign origin was considered to be in the scope of material security, which does not fit into the
specific scope of the GNDA. Transit of RN materials from one foreign country to another was
also not considered because the ultimate focus of the architecture is on not allowing materials
inside the United States where they can be used for an attack; this also helps simplify the model
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greatly. Therefore, foreign departure, which overlaps with the U.S. border layer, was the main
focus of this objective. The components of Objective 2.1 are shown below in Figure 6.
Figure 6. Objective 2.1 Sub-Objectives and Metrics

The objective was divided into two sub-objectives: Detect RN materials out of regulatory
control (1) at foreign ports of departure (PODs), and (2) in route to the United States. For the
first sub-objective concerning foreign PODs, the metrics created were the probability of
detecting U.S. bound RN materials and foreign seaports and foreign airports. It is important to
note that the metrics only include U.S. bound RN materials out of regulatory control. Since the
purpose of the GNDA is to protect specifically the United States from RN attacks by terrorists,
the transportation of RN materials from one country to another is not considered in the model.
The main focus of the nation’s nuclear counterterrorism efforts is to keep the materials out of the
nation, regardless of where the attempt to bring in these materials comes from. Thus, focusing
only on the transport from foreign departure to the United States simplifies the model and makes
it more outcome-oriented.
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As mentioned, the exterior layer of the GNDA overlaps with the U.S. border layer. The
reason for this overlap is because materials can be transported from Canada or Mexico to the
United States by land through the U.S. border; the departure from the foreign country and entry
into the United States happens almost simultaneously. To eliminate redundancy, only foreign
seaports and airports are considered under Objective 2.1, and U.S. border crossings are
considered under Objective 2.2.
The second sub-objective for Objective 2.1 is the detection of RN materials in route to
the United States. Specifically, this sub-objective focuses on efforts of the U.S. Coast Guard in
its role of maritime security. The metric used is the percentage of vessels in the U.S. coastal
region searched by the coast guard. This metric relies on the assumption that if the Coast Guard
searches a vessel, it will detect any unregulated RN materials present.
The focus of Objective 2.2 is the detection of RN materials at the United States borders.
As in the notional example provided by the committee, the objective is split up into detection
efforts at ports of entry (POEs) and between ports of entry. The metrics related to this first subobjective, the detection of RN materials at U.S. ports of entry, are shown on below in Figure 7.
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Figure 7. Objective 2.2 Sub-Objectives and Metrics (1)

This sub-objective is divided into five different metrics based on types of POEs. The five
metrics are the probability of detecting incoming RN materials at major U.S. seaports, minor
U.S. seaports, primary U.S. airports, vehicle border crossings, and rail border crossings. The
reason seaports were divided into major and minor seaports because large variations exist in the
RN detection equipment deployed at the 22 seaports with greatest volume of imports and the
remaining U.S. seaports (Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General [OIG],
2013).
The second sub-objective for Objective 2.2 focuses on the detection of incoming RN
materials between POEs. The two metrics that measure this sub-objective breakdown the
measurement into RN materials transported via land and via water. Namely, the metrics are the
probability of detecting RN materials transported across the U.S. border via land between POEs
and the probability of detection of RN materials entering the country via the 95,000 miles of
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shoreline that exist between seaports. The components related to the second sub-objective, to
detect RN materials between ports of entry, are shown below in Figure 8.
Figure 8. Objective 2.2 Sub-Objectives and Metrics (2)

The third and final objective of Goal 2 is to detect RN materials out of regulatory control
inside the United States border. This objective encompasses all efforts of detecting unregulated
RN material once it successfully enters the country or it is taken from a secure facility within the
United States. Referring to the geographical layers shown previously in Figure 2, the interior
layer of detection includes U.S. origin, the regional U.S., target vicinity, and the actual target. As
mentioned earlier in the paper, material security shares an interface with detection, but it is not
within the scope of the GNDA. Thus, this model does not include U.S. origin of RN materials.
The first sub-objective under Objective 2.3 models the U.S. regional sub-layer of the
GNDA structure. The U.S. regional layer is represented as the transport of RN materials across
the country; this encompasses the actions a terrorist can take to transport the materials from the
one location within the country to the target vicinity. The sub-objective is divided into five
metrics that measure the probability of detection by modes of transportation, specifically, train,

22

truck, inland waterways, primary airports, and non-primary airports. Primary airports are defined
as having 10,000 or more passenger borders each year while non-primary airports have fewer
than 10,000 (Federal Aviation Administration, 2012). Sub-Objective 2.3.1 and its metrics are
shown below in Figure 9.
Figure 9. Objective 2.3 Sub-Objectives and Metrics (1)

The second sub-objective of Objective 2.3, and the final portion of Goal 2, models
aspects related to detecting RN materials within target vicinity and at the target. These two sublayers are modeled together because the target and target vicinity blur together due to the vast
area of destruction and/or disruption of radiological and nuclear weapons. The targets that a
terrorist may choose to attack are divided into urban areas and critical infrastructure. Critical
infrastructure is defined by the Department of Homeland Security as, “the assets, systems, and
networks, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that their incapacitation or
destruction would have a debilitating effect on security, national economic security, national
public health or safety, or any combination thereof” [INSERT SOURCE
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]. Such infrastructure targets range anywhere from government facilities to public drinking water
systems. Figure 10 below shows the metrics related to Sub-Objective 2.3.2.
Figure 10. Objective 2.3 Sub-Objectives and Metrics (2)

3. 1. 3 Goal 3: Reduce the Consequences
The third goal of the model is to reduce the consequences of a successful radiological or
nuclear attack on the nation. The two objectives presented by the committee in the notional
example—diverting RN attacks to lower-consequence targets and providing early warning of RN
attacks—were kept the same, but sub-objectives were added to the first objective. These subobjectives break down the term targets into urban areas and critical infrastructure, as done in the
previous section. The components related to the measurement of Goal 3 are shown below in
Figure 11.
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Figure 11. Goal 3 Objectives and Metrics

The metric developed to measure the ability of the GNDA to divert RN attacks to lowerconsequence cities is based off spending on the Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI). The
UASI program is part of the Homeland Security Grant Program, and the funds allocated by the
program “address the unique planning, organization, equipment, training, and exercise needs of
high-threat, high-density urban areas, and assists them in building an enhanced and sustainable
capacity to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from acts of terrorism”
(Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Grand Program [HSGP], 2013). In 2013
UASI allocated over 350 million dollars to 25 high-threat, high-density urban areas. The specific
metric used is the percent of the United States population covered by the UASI. This metric
relies on the assumptions that the money allocated to each of these cities was used efficiently in
regards to detection measures, and also that the funds were used on radiological and nuclear
detection efforts instead of on other efforts such as bioterrorism countermeasures. This metric
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also ignores other aspects that the funds can be used for such as in response and recovery from
an attack.
The metric to measure for diverting RN attacks to lower-consequence critical
infrastructure is the percentage of critical infrastructure targets protected by RN detection
equipment. The third and final metric for Goal 3 measures the ability of the GNDA to provide
early warning of RN attacks, and the metric is the detection alert time. This metric is based on a
constructed scale of when RN materials out of regulatory control are detected. The scale is
broken up into five sections ranging from detecting RN terrorism plans in advance, to detecting
in time at the U.S. border, to the worst scenario of detecting after an event occurs.

3. 1. 4 Goal 4: Reduce the Unintended Side Effects
The final goal of the model is to reduce the unintended side effects of RN
countermeasures. The same three objectives the committee created in the notional strategic plan
are used in the model. These objectives and their metrics are shown below in Figure 12.
Figure 12. Goal 4 Objectives and Metrics
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The first objective—minimize impacts on privacy and civil liberties—is measured by the
number of complaints from civil liberty groups with zero being the ideal number. The second
objective—minimize impacts on flow of commerce and the economy—is measured using a
constructed scale as a performance rating. The scale ranges from 1 to 5 with a score of 5 being
no impact and 1 being an extreme impact on the flow of commerce and the economy.
The final objective related to unintended side effects of the GNDA is to avoid transfer of
RN risks to other nations. This is an interesting objective that almost counters progress of the
other objectives; if the GNDA is performing very well and it is difficult for terrorists to attack
the United States, terrorists may divert their attacks to other nations. Thus, while the other
objectives have high performance values, this objective would be given a lower score. Therefore,
the metric used to measure this objective is the number of countries spending money on global
nuclear detection efforts. The more countries that are spending money on NCT, the lower the
probability of diverting RN attacks to other nations. Also, it will be harder for terrorists acquire
and transport RN materials, thus reducing the probability of RN attacks in general.

3. 1. 5 Summary of Model Structure
The model created to evaluate the performance of the Global Nuclear Detection
Architecture if fairly complex. There are twenty-five different metrics used to measure series of
ten objectives and nine sub-objectives. All of these objectives support one of four main goals,
which contribute to the mission and vision of the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture. The
entire model structure can be seen in Appendix IV.
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3.2

Assigning Value Functions
Value functions are the part of the model that assigns a metric’s score a specific value.

They are used to measure “returns to scale over the range of the value measure” (Parnell et al.,
2011). Value metrics have varying units, so the use of value functions allows for scores to be
converted to a standard unit.
Value functions can be either continuous or discrete. The majority of measures in the
model were given continuous value functions. Specifically in relation to the metrics associated
with Goal 2, reducing the vulnerability to the nation, the measures were given continuous value
functions with increasing returns to scale. For an example, the value function that was created
within Logical Decisions for Metric 9—probability of detecting RN materials at vehicle border
crossings—is shown below in Figure 13.
Figure 13. Continuous Value Function for Metric 9
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On the x-axis of the graph is the scale of the value measure, which in this case is the
probability of detection for RN materials at U.S. vehicle border crossings. This probability
ranges from 0 to 1. On the y-axis is the standard unit of value scaled from 0 to 100. Since this
function is convex with increasing returns to scale, as the probability of detection increases, the
resulting value increases exponentially. This shape was chosen because if RN materials were
only correctly identified at border crossings half of the time, it would not be of much value in the
protection of the United States. It is only when an attempt is detected a large majority of the time
that the detection efforts are very valuable.
As shown in the lower part of Figure 13, the selected point for the function has a level of .6
and a value of .25. This means that if the U.S. vehicle border crossings are successful in
detecting unregulated RN materials 60% of the time, the return to scale will be 25 (out of a
possible 100) in the value model.
The only discrete value functions used in the model were for the two measures with
constructed scales. These were Metric 22—detection alert times—and Metric 24—a performance
rating on level of impact to commerce and the economy. The value function for Metric 24 is
shown below in Figure 14.

29

Figure 14. Discrete Value Function for Metric 24

In this value function, the measure is given a standard value score of 100 if the GNDA is
rated as having no impact on commerce and the economy, a value score of 60 if it as rated as
having minimal impact, and so on and so forth.

4

Model Use and Analysis
After the structure of the model was complete and it was created in the Logical Decisions

software, the metrics could be scored and analysis was performed on the model. The specific
activities associated with this portion of the project were (1) scoring the metrics, (2) assigning
weights to the metrics, and (3) evaluating the results. Both sensitivity analysis and cost-benefit
analysis were performed.

4.1

Scoring the Metrics
Two alternatives were evaluated using the model: the ideal performance for the GNDA and

the baseline, or current, level of performance. Each alternative was given a notional score for
each metric to assess the GNDA’s performance. For the ideal alternative, the best possible value
for each metric was chosen. However, it is important to note that this value, while the ideal
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value, was not always feasible. For example, it would be ideal to have every single country
spending money on global nuclear detection efforts, but this is neither possible nor practical with
for many third-world countries.
Because much of the data related to RN detection efforts is not publicly available, notional
values were given to many of the metrics in the baseline alternative. However, the metrics were
researched thoroughly so that reasonable notional values were given when possible. This list of
metrics and their associated used in the model are given below in Table 1. This table also shows
if the values used are notional and, if they are not, the source that the data comes from.
Table 1. Baseline Metric Values with Sources

For the baseline alternative, the metrics were also given a confidence interval to account for
uncertainty common to most measurements. Since the confidence ranges typically could not be
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accurately predicted using publicized data, most of the confidence intervals are featured as a
triangular distribution to simplify the model. The triangular distributions each feature a notional
minimum and maximum value with the midpoint being the value score noted in Table 1.
However, for the constructed scales the uncertainty is measured as a probability breakdown
between two or more of the possible scale outcomes. The metrics and their associated scores and
confidence intervals are shown below in Table 2.
Table 2. Baseline Metric Values with Ranges

*Range: Detect in Time Outside U.S (10%), Detect in Time at U.S. Border (90%), Detect in Time Inside
U.S. (10%)

The data shown in these two tables along with additional information regarding the value
scores and the full sources can be found in Appendix V.
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4.2

Establishing the Weights
Measure weights are a significant aspect in value modeling; weights allow the user of the

model to establish what metrics are more important to the stakeholders and then factor this into
the overall score of alternatives. For appropriate swing weights to be used, the weights need to
reflect both the importance of the value measure and the level of variation that exists in the range
of the measure. More weight should be given to the metrics that are important to the stakeholders
and have a large range from minimal acceptable to ideal. To assess the performance value of the
GNDA, three different sets of weights were used: equal weights, weights based on spending, and
weights based on the adversary’s viewpoint.

4. 2. 1 Weight Set 1: Equal Weights
The first set of weights considered is that of equal weights for all twenty-five metrics.
This means that each metric is assigned .04% of the weight of the entire model. The results
output from Logical Decisions using equal weights are shown below in Figure 15.
Figure 15. Evaluation of Alternatives Using Equal Weights

The model output displays the overall value of the ideal and baseline alternatives into
value component graphs (stacked bar graphs) based on the performance of each goal. The ideal
alternative has an overall score of 100 as expected, while the baseline alternative has a value of
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50 given the use of equal weights. The uncertainties of each measure are also shown for the
baseline alternative. The value uncertainty summary for the baseline is shown in Figure 16.
Figure 16. Value Uncertainty Summary for Baseline Using Equal Weights

This value shows that while the mean score is 50, the median overall score for the model
is 51 while the minimum and maximum possible scores based on uncertainties are 48 and 53,
respectively.

4. 2. 2 Weight Set 2: Weights Based on Government Spending
The second set of metrics was established to reflect the level of importance of the metrics
to the DNDO and national government. The weights were created based on the United States’
viewpoint of what were the most important aspects in regards to nuclear counterterrorism. To
assess the priorities of the DNDO, the weights were based on government spending in terms of
nuclear counterterrorism measures. However, finding the breakdown of spending related to
various measures was a complicated task. Because the DNDO does not have a centralized
budget, spending towards a specific measure could span efforts from several different
government agencies. Also, only a very general budget breakdown of each agency’s spending is
publicly available. Nevertheless, weights were established to reflect spending as perceived from
available budgets and individual research on metrics. Each measure was given a value of 10, 50
or 100. For metrics not associated with spending efforts, such as number of complaints from civil
liberty groups, weights were just based on perceived importance. The breakdown of the second
set of weights is shown below in Table 3.
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Table 3. Weights Based on Government Spending

These weights were input into the Logical Decisions, and the model output can be seen
below in Figure 17.
Figure 17. Evaluation of Alternatives Based on Government’s Viewpoint

Based on this set of weights, the overall rating for the baseline performance is 62. This is
a 24% increase from the performance rating based on equal weights. This significant increase
(assuming the notional values have some accuracy to them) shows that the aspects of nuclear
counterterrorism that the government considers to be more important correlate with the aspects
that are performing better. It can be inferred that the government spending has led to an
increased performance in measures that are considered to be of more importance.
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Figure 18 below shows the value uncertainty summary for the baseline as measured by
the weights based on government spending. As seen in the figure, the overall performance rating
for the baseline can range from 59 to 65 with the mean score being 62, as mentioned earlier.
Figure 18. Value Uncertainty Summary Using Government’s Viewpoint Weights

4. 2. 3 Weight Set 3: Weights Based on Adversary’s Viewpoint
The third and final set of weights used to evaluate this model was based on the
adversary’s viewpoint. The measures were given a value of 10, 50, or 100 based on their possible
perception on ability to avoid detection. Because the metrics related to Goal 2 are scored on
probability of detection at different layers in the GNDA, the highest weights were given to the
path of least resistance to the attacker. This relies on the assumption that the attacker will take
the path of the lowest probability of detection when planning an attack on the nation. The
weights given to each metric are shown below in Table 4.
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Table 4. Weights Based on Adversary’s Viewpoint

The output of Logical Decisions using these weights and the uncertainty summary are
shown below in Figure 19 and Figure 20.
Figure 19. Evaluation of Alternatives Using Adversary Weights
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Figure 20. Value Uncertainty Summary for Baseline Using Adversary Weights

Using weights based on the adversary’s viewpoint decreased the mean baseline
performance rating to 36. This is to be expected since higher weight was given to the metrics
related to probability of detection that had a lower score. Based on the uncertainties, the
minimum possible rating score using the inputs specified in the report is a 33 while the
maximum score is a 38.

4.3

Evaluating the Model

4. 3. 1 Sensitivity Analysis
When using value modeling to decide between candidate solutions, it is important to
conduct sensitivity analysis to evaluate the robustness of the analysis. Sensitivity analysis of
weights is conducted to see if “a change in an assumption changes the preferred solution”
(Parnell et al., 2011). Because the model in this report only compares the current system to the
ideal outcome, the use of sensitivity analysis to compare alternatives is not applicable. However,
sensitivity analysis can be performed to show how change in weights will affect the overall
performance rating of the baseline.
For an example, Metric 6, the probability of detecting RN materials at major U.S.
seaports, is considered using the results from the second set of weights that was based on
government spending. The sensitivity graph for the measure that was created by the Logical
Decisions is shown below in Figure 21.
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Figure 21. Sensitivity Analysis for Metric 6

On the y-axis of this graph is the overall model performance rating based on the given set
of weights. On the x-axis is the percent of total weight that this measure makes up. The vertical
line to the right of the y-axis shows where the measure currently is. Based on this set of weights,
Metric 6 is currently set to 7% of the total weight of the model. The green line shows how the
total value of the model increases or decreases based on how the percent of total weight for this
metric is changed. If Metric 6 was given no weight in the model, the mode’s overall performance
rating would drop to 59. However, if the government thought that probability of detection at
seaports was the most important aspect in all of nuclear counterterrorism and set its weight to
50% of the total weight, the performance of the model would increase to approximately 75
(estimated from graph).
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Sensitivity analysis is not only limited to evaluating the weight assigned to a specific
measure; it can also be applied an overarching section of the model that is composed of multiple
metrics, such as one of the four goals in this model.

4. 3. 2 Cost-Benefit Analysis
Cost-benefit analysis is a valuable technique typically used to evaluate the cost vs. value
tradeoff for a series of alternatives. Because only one alternative, the baseline, was evaluated in
this model, cost-benefit analysis can instead be used to show how decreases or increases in
spending in specific GNDA areas will likely affect the overall score of the model. To provide an
example for this analysis, Metric 10, detecting an attempt to bring RN materials into the U.S. at
rail border crossings, is considered. Since 2001 well over 1,000 Radiation Portal Monitors
(RPMs) have been deployed at border crossings around the nation. Each portal monitor costs
roughly $450,000 (Schneidmiller, 2009).
For the example, suppose the Customs Border Patrol deploys 50 additional RPMs at rail
border crossings, making the total cost of the project around $22.5 million. The current
probability of detecting RN material at rail border crossings for the baseline model is at .80.
Suppose these additional monitors are projected to bring the total probability for Metric 10 up to
.90. By inputting this new metric value into the model, the overall GNDA performance rating
(using the second set of weights) increases from 62 to 63. This analysis can be repeated for other
spending alternatives to see how they affect the model output. This analysis should then be
applied to evaluate how future resources can be allocated so that the potential GNDA
performance rating is maximized.
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5

Conclusion

5.1

Model Significance
Evaluating the effectiveness of the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture is an important

task that will allow for the progress and development of the architecture to be tracked over time.
The evaluation will allow for a better prioritization of GNDA resources, resulting in more
efficient allocation of funds and the potential to improve the performance at a quicker rate. Even
though the effectiveness rating in this report cannot be taken as true due to the use of notional
data, the report provides a good example of how to assess the GNDA performance.

5.2

Future Development
The DNDO can use this model to input the classified data and come up with an applicable

performance rating for the GNDA. The DNDO should adapt the model to adjust the metrics
where it sees necessary, and it should decide on the set of weights deemed most appropriate for
the GNDA evaluation. As suggested in the report by the NRC, the DNDO should also create an
Analysis Framework to assist in the model’s evaluation. The framework will need to incorporate
the development of additional models, similar to the PEM model mentioned earlier, that evaluate
the performance of specific metrics within the GNDA model.
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APPENDIX I
List of Commonly Used Acronyms

•

DNDO: Domestic Nuclear Detection Office

•

GNDA: Global Nuclear Detection Architecture

•

NCT: Nuclear Counterterrorism

•

NRC: National Research Council

•

RPM: Radiation Portal Monitor

•

UASI: Urban Areas Security Initiative
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APPENDIX II
Statement of Task

An ad hoc committee will conduct a study and prepare a report to the Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office (DNDO) on quantitative approaches for evaluating the effectiveness of the
Global Nuclear Detection Architecture, specifically in the context of the following two tasks:
Task 1: Assess the feasibility of using performance measures and quantitative metrics for
evaluating progress toward meeting the performance goals in the Global Nuclear Detection
Architecture Strategic Plan
The committee should assess the feasibility of using performance measures and
quantitative metrics for evaluating progress in meeting these performance goals. This assessment
should consider the following factors:
•

Definition of performance measures for each of the performance goals in the Strategic
Plan.

•

Definition of quantifiable performance metrics for each performance measure including,
as appropriate, efficiency, output, and outcome-oriented performance measures.

•

Identification of data to be used to quantify these performance metrics.

•

Identification of methodologies to be used to collect and analyze these data.

•

Specification of performance target values for assessing the effectiveness of each
performance measure.

If the use of performance measures and quantitative metrics is determined to be feasible, the
committee should, to the extent practical, recommend specific performance measures, metrics,
and the other supporting information described in the list above for consideration by the
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office.
If the use of performance measures and metrics is determined to be infeasible, the committee
should recommend alternative evaluation approaches.
Task 2: Recommend approaches for evaluating the overall effectiveness of the Global
Nuclear Detection Architecture
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The committee should specifically recommend
•

Approaches for developing an overall analysis framework to assess the effectiveness
of the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture in terms of its ability to detect, deny,
confuse, and/or deter adversaries.

•

Approaches for exercising this analysis framework using combinations of
modeling/simulation, red teaming, and/or related methods to assess the cost
effectiveness of and tradeoffs in Global Nuclear Detection Architecture components.

In executing these tasks the committee should examine efforts by other organizations to
develop risk-informed metrics and analysis approaches for complex technological systems.
This project is sponsored by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's Domestic
Nuclear Detection Office.
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APPENDIX III
Notional Strategic Plan with Metrics
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APPENDIX IV
Entire Model Structure
Vision: “For U.S. citizens to live free from the fear of nuclear or radiological terrorism.”
Mission: “Protect the nation from terrorist attacks that use radiological or nuclear (RN)
materials.”
Goal 1: Reduce the threat to the nation of radiological or nuclear (RN) attacks by terrorists.
•

Objective 1.1: Deter terrorists’ RN attacks by demonstrating the high likelihood of failure


•

Metric 1: Probability of deterrence by denial

Objective 1.2: Identify terrorist plans for radiological or nuclear attacks


Metric 2: Probability of identifying terrorists’ plans via intelligence efforts

Goal 2: Reduce the vulnerability of the nation to RN attacks by terrorists.
•

Objective 2.1: Detect RN materials out of regulatory control outside of the United States
o Sub-Objective 2.1.1: Detect RN materials out of regulatory control at foreign
ports of departure (PODs)


Metric 3: Probability of detecting U.S. bound RN materials at foreign
seaports



Metric 4: Probability of detecting U.S. bound RN materials at foreign
airports

o Sub-Objective 2.1.2: Detect RN materials out of regulatory control in route to the
U.S.

•

Metric 5: Percentage of vessels in the U.S. coastal region that are searched

Objective 2.2: Detect RN materials out of regulatory control at the border of the United
States
o Sub-Objective 2.2.1: Detect RN materials at U.S. ports of entry (POEs)


Metric 6: Probability of detecting an attempt to bring RN materials into
the U.S. at major U.S. seaports



Metric 7: Probability of detecting an attempt to bring RN materials into
the U.S. at minor U.S. seaports
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Metric 8: Probability of detecting an attempt to bring RN materials into
the U.S. at primary U.S. airports



Metric 9: Probability of detecting an attempt to bring RN materials into
the U.S. at vehicle border crossings



Metric 10: Probability of detecting an attempt to bring RN materials into
the U.S. at rail border crossings

o Sub-Objective 2.2.2: Detect RN materials between U.S. ports of entry (POEs)


Metric 11: Probability of detecting an attempt to bring RN materials into
the U.S. via land between ports of entry



Metric 12: Probability of detecting an attempt to bring RN materials into
the U.S. via coastal region between seaports

•

Objective 2.3: Detect RN materials out of regulatory control inside of the United States
o Sub-Objective 2.3.1: Detect RN materials being transported inside the U.S.


Metric 13: Probability of detecting materials transported within the U.S.
via train



Metric 14: Probability of detecting materials transported within the U.S.
via highway system



Metric 15: Probability of detecting materials transported within the U.S.
via inland waterways



Metric 16: Probability of detecting materials transported within the U.S.
via primary airports



Metric 17: Probability of detecting materials transported within the U.S.
via non-primary airports

o Sub-Objective 2.3.2: Detect RN materials within target vicinity inside the U.S.


Metric 18: Probability of detecting RN materials around major urban areas



Metric 19: Probability of detecting RN materials around critical
infrastructure

Goal 3: Reduce the consequences of a successful radiological or nuclear attack on the nation.
•

Objective 3.1: Divert RN attacks to lower-consequence targets
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o Sub-Objective 3.1.1: Divert RN attacks to lower-consequence cities


Metric 20: Percent of U.S. population covered by Urban Areas Security
Initiative

o Sub-Objective 3.1.2: Divert RN attacks to lower-consequence critical
infrastructure

•

Metric 21: Percent of critical infrastructure targets protected

Objective 3.2: Provide early warning of RN attacks


Metric 22: Detection alert times

Goal 4: Reduce the unintended side effects of RN countermeasures
•

Objective 4.1: Minimize impacts on privacy and civil liberties


•

Metric 23: Number of complaints from civil liberty groups

Objective 4.2: Minimize impacts on flow of commerce and the economy


Metric 24: Performance rating on level of impact to commerce and the
economy

•

Objective 4.3: Avoid transfer of RN risks to other nations


Metric 25: Number of countries spending money on global nuclear
detection efforts
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APPENDIX V
Baseline Metric Scores with Sources and Additional Notes

For the “Notes” column, the letter ‘N’ indicates that the metric was given a notional value.
However, the sources or details for the remaining metrics are listed below
1. Source: Bliss, J. (2012). U.S. backs off all-cargo scanning goal with inspection at 4%.
Bloomberg. Retrieved from http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-13/u-s-backs-offall-cargo-scanning-goal-with-inspections-at-4-.html
2. Source: Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General. (2013). United
State’s Customs and Border Protection’s radiation portal monitors and seaports. (Report
number OIG-13-26). Retrieved from http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2013/OIG_1326_Jan13.pdf
3. Source: Bakir, N.O. (2008). A decision tree model for evaluating countermeasures to
secure cargo at United States southwestern ports of entry Published Articles & Papers.
Paper 1.http://research.create.usc.edu/published_papers/1
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a. Relies on assumption that RPMs at the northern U.S. border are performing at the
same success rate
4. Percent value calculated by totaling the estimated population of the twenty-five cities
covered by the Urban Area Security Initiative in 2013 and dividing this number by the
total United States population
a. Source of twenty-five UASI funded cities:
Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Grant Program. (2013).
FY 2013 Homeland Security Grant Program fact sheet. Retrieved from
http://www.fema.gov/media-librarydata/8d0439562c89644a68954505a49cbc77/FY_2013_Homeland+Security+
Grant+Program_Fact_Sheet_+Final.pdf
5. No complaints could be found from numerous Google searches.
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